Annual report 1978-79 by American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight Board
University of Mississippi
eGrove
AICPA Annual Reports American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(AICPA) Historical Collection
1979
Annual report 1978-79
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in AICPA Annual Reports by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact
egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight Board, "Annual report 1978-79" (1979).
AICPA Annual Reports. 34.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts/34
Public Oversight Board
Annual Report
1978-79
Public Oversight Board 
SEC Practice Section 
Division for CPA Firms
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Public Oversight Board
John J. McCloy, Chairman 
Ray Garrett, Jr., Vice Chairman 
William L. Cary 
John D. Harper 
Arthur M. Wood
Staff: Louis W. Matusiak
Stuart Newman
Office: 1270 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020
Public Oversight Board
Annual Report  
1978-79
Public Oversight Board 
SEC Practice Section 
Division for CPA Firms
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Public Oversight Board
SEC PRACTICE SECTION 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1 2 7 0  A V E N U E  OF T H E  A M E R I C A S  . N E W Y O R K ,  N E W  Y O R K  1 0 0 2 0  . ( 21 2)  7 6 5 - 4 6 2 8
JOHN J. McCLOY 
Chairman
RAY GARRETT, JR. 
Vice Chairman
WILLIAM L. CARY 
JOHN D. HARPER 
ARTHUR M. WOOD
LOUIS W MATUSIAK 
Executive Director
March 31, 1979
To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section, 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Other Interested Persons
Attached hereto is the first annual report of the 
Public Oversight Board covering its activities from the 
first meeting in March 1978 through March 31, 1979. Since 
this is the Board's first annual report, it reviews and 
comments on the purpose and structure of the SEC Practice 
Section of which the Board is a part, in addition to 
reporting on the organization and activities of the Board 
itself.
The Board's first year was devoted principally to
(1) organizing, defining its role and recruiting its staff,
(2) advising on policy matters during the development of 
the Section's peer review program, (3) monitoring initial 
peer reviews, (4) studying the question of the scope of 
services provided by CPA firms and preparing and publishing 
a report containing recommendations on the subject, and
(5) considering the question of what action should be taken 
by the Section in the event of an alleged or possible audit 
failure involving one of its member firms.
In the course of this work a number of formal Board 
meetings were held, and the Board or one or more of its 
members or staff met on numerous occasions with the Executive 
Committee and various officers and staff members of the 
Section. The Board also held a two-day public hearing on 
the scope of services question and received written comments 
from a substantial number of firms and individuals interested 
in the matter. On two occasions members of the Board 
testified before a Congressional subcommittee. In addition, 
members of the Board and its staff held two meetings with 
Chairman Williams, Commissioner Pollack, Chief Accountant 
Sampson and various members of the staff of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and members of the Board's staff 
held numerous conferences with members of the Commission's 
staff. As part of the Board's oversight program, a member 
of the Board attended the exit conference for each 1978 peer 
review involving a major firm.
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Based upon experience to date, the Board has concluded 
that its own organization and authority are sufficient to 
enable it to carry out its oversight role and effectively 
contribute to and assist the profession in instituting and 
maintaining a vigorous and exacting self-regulatory system. 
The Board also has concluded that a well-considered structure 
for self-regulation of accounting firms has been initiated 
by the accounting profession. Perhaps the most important 
element of that structure, the mandatory peer review program, 
is in place and has started to function effectively. The 
Board recognizes, of course, that as experience is gained 
some procedures may be modified and improved. Moreover, the 
Board believes that the Section is in the process of dealing 
effectively with other major issues, including the scope of 
services issue and the question of the Section's role with 
respect to alleged or possible audit failures.
The Board believes that, due to the substantial progress 
to date, the strong commitment of the profession and the 
encouragement and support of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Section's program of self-regulation will 
be effective. Moreover, the Board believes that, as a matter 
of principle, self-regulation is preferable to additional 
governmental regulation and that every effort should be made 
to assure the success of the Section's program.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
John J. McCloy 
Chairman
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ANNUAL REPORT 
1978 - 1979
This is the first annual report of the Public 
Oversight Board ("Board") covering its activities from the 
first meeting in March 1978 through March 31, 1979. Since 
this is the Board’s first annual report, it reviews and com­
ments on the purpose and structure of the Section of which 
the Board is a part, in addition to reporting on the organi­
zation and activities of the Board itself.
I. THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
A. Organization
During the last three years, some members of Con­
gress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (”SEC”) 
have expressed concern regarding the accountability of pub­
licly owned corporations and their auditors. Attention has 
been focused on the manner in which the accounting profes­
sion is regulated and disciplined. In response, the Council 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
("Institute”) took the initiative in September 1977 by 
establishing the Division for CPA Firms ("Division”), com­
prised of an SEC Practice Section ("Section”) and a Private 
Companies Practice Section, to implement a program of volun­
tary self-regulation and self-disciplining of the profession 
by establishing requirements for practice by member firms 
and by creating the authority to impose sanctions for fail­
ure to comply with such requirements. Some members of Con­
gress expressed doubt regarding the efficacy of the profes­
sion’s program of self-regulation and on June 16, 1978, Con­
gressman Moss introduced legislation1/ to create a regula­
tory organization for accountants patterned after the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. However,
1/ HR 13175, A Bill to Establish a National Organization 
of Securities and Exchange Commission Accountancy, 
95th Congress, 2nd Sess.
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the SEC, in its 1978 Report to Congress2/ ("SEC 1978 Report 
to Congress") concluded that progress during the preceding 
year had been "sufficient to merit continued opportunity for 
the profession to pursue its efforts at self-regulation" and 
that the SEC would not recommend the adoption of legislation 
"to supersede or control self-regulation of accountants at 
this time."
Prior to September 1977, the Institute, which is a 
professional association with some 144,000 individual CPA 
members, was not structured to regulate the activities of 
CPA firms. The Division now provides the organizational 
structure for regulating the activities of member firms. 
The creation of the Division has been the subject of litiga­
tion; recently, however, a court rejected the challenge by 
certain individual members to the procedures by which the 
Division was established.3/ As of March 31, 1979, 550 firms 
were members of the Section and 1,484 firms were members of 
the Private Companies Practice Section (517 firms were mem­
bers of both Sections). While the membership requirements 
and program of the Section are designed specifically for CPA 
firms that audit companies whose securities are required to 
be registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 ("SEC clients"), 340 member firms have no SEC 
clients.
Some concern had been expressed in the SEC 1978 
Report to Congress (p. 18) as to the ability of the Insti­
tute to regulate CPA firms effectively, since membership in 
the Section is not mandatory. As indicated in the discus­
sion of the peer review program (pages 13 and 14), a very 
high percentage of SEC reporting companies are audited by 
members of the Section, and the Section is studying methods 
for encouraging nonmember firms to join the Section. It is 
expected that the importance of membership in the Section 
will cause issuers, lenders and others who employ auditors 
or rely on audited financial statements of SEC clients to 
view less favorably CPA firms that do not participate in the 
programs of the Section.
Nevertheless, the Board shares the SEC's and the 
profession's concerns about the number of firms that audit 
SEC clients which are not members of the Section and be­
lieves that the Section should make every effort to increase 
the membership to provide the greatest possible coverage.
2/ The Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight 
Role, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., (Comm. Print. 1978),p. 44.
3/ In Re Alam, 180 N.Y.L.J., August 2, 1978, p. 6, col. 3 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., August 1, 1978).
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The structure and functions of the Section are set 
forth in its Organization Document, a copy of which, as 
amended and in effect at March 31, 1979 but excluding appen­
dices, is attached as Exhibit I to this report.
Two key objectives of the Section are to (1) im­
prove the quality of accounting and auditing practice by CPA 
firms through the establishment of practice requirements for 
member firms and (2) establish and maintain an effective 
system of self-regulation of member firms by means of manda­
tory triennial peer reviews of a firm's accounting and 
auditing practice, required maintenance of an appropriate 
system of quality control, and the imposition of sanctions 
for failure to meet membership requirements.
B. Objectives of the Section
C. Structure of the Section
The Section is governed by an Executive Committee 
with the assistance of a Peer Review Committee and such 
other committees, subcommittees, and task forces as are con­
sidered necessary. The Executive Committee is responsible 
for (1) establishment of general policies and the oversight 
of Section activities, (2) amendment of membership require­
ments as necessary, (3) determination of sanctions to be 
imposed on member firms either on its own initiative or 
based upon recommendations of the Peer Review Committee, and 
(4) action to be taken upon complaints received with respect 
to member firms.
A substantial majority of the members of the 
Executive Committee are representatives of firms that audit 
30 or more SEC clients. Representative Moss, SEC Chairman 
Williams and spokesmen of some smaller firms have expressed 
concern that the Section might be too heavily dominated by 
representatives of the larger firms. The present provisions 
of the Organization Document reflect some modifications in 
composition, voting, and quorum requirements made in re­
sponse to these concerns.4/ The Board, in exercising its 
oversight responsibilities, will be mindful of the concern 
that has been expressed in this regard.
The Peer Review Committee is responsible for 
(1) establishment of standards for performing and reporting
4/ See Organization Document, VI.2.(c). Membership on the 
Executive Committee includes 16 individuals from firms 
that audit 30 or more SEC clients and 5 individuals from 
other firms.
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on peer reviews, (2) administration of the program of peer 
reviews for member firms and the maintenance of appropriate 
records of peer reviews, and (3) recommendations of sanc­
tions and other disciplinary actions to the Executive Com­
mittee.
D . Membership Requirements
Each member firm is required to have a review at 
least once every three years of the manner in which it con­
ducts its accounting and auditing practice in order to 
provide assurance that it has quality control policies and 
procedures which are appropriate for its practice and which 
comply with professional standards and with the Section’s 
membership requirements. Other membership requirements re­
late to the professional qualifications of the members of 
the firm, continuing professional education, liability in­
surance coverage, dues, and administrative matters. The 
Section also imposes on its members, with respect to SEC 
clients, requirements related to audit partner rotation, 
concurring reviews, scope of management advisory services, 
and reporting to audit committees or boards of directors.
II. PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
A stated objective of the Section is to "enhance 
the effectiveness of the section's regulatory system 
through the monitoring and evaluation activities of an 
independent oversight board composed of public members."
The responsibilities and functions of the Board, as 
set forth in the Organization Document, are to: (1) monitor 
and evaluate the regulatory and sanction activities of the 
Peer Review and Executive Committees of the Section; (2) de­
termine that the Peer Review Committee is ascertaining that 
firms are taking appropriate action as a result of peer re­
views; (3) conduct continuing oversight of all other activ­
ities of the Section; (4) make recommendations to the Exec­
utive Committee for improvements in the operations of the 
Section; and (5) publish an annual report and such other 
reports as may be deemed necessary with respect to its 
activities. The Organization Document requires the Sec­
tion's Executive Committee and Peer Review Committee to 
consult from time to time with the Board, and members of the 
Board have the right to attend meetings of those committees.
During its initial meetings, the Board considered 
at length its oversight role contemplated by the Organiza­
tion. Document, as contrasted to an arrangement in which it 
would have authority to compel compliance with its views and 
to overrule Executive Committee decisions contrary thereto. 
The Board concluded that its oversight role should be pre­
served and that it should not have line or appellate review
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authority. While there may be some advantages to being able 
to exercise line authority, the Board concluded that its 
ability to offer objective comment and criticism would be 
greater if it were not a formal part of the structure for 
planning and executing policy decisions of the Section. The 
Board also concluded that its ability to comment publicly on 
any matter regarding the accounting profession would provide 
sufficient power to discharge the Board's responsibilities. 
The SEC 1978 Report to Congress (p. 17) expressed concern 
that the Board did not have line authority. However, the 
report stated that the SEC was not prepared to conclude that 
the lack of line authority would necessarily be fatal to the 
Board's effectiveness. The Board's experience thus far 
indicates that line authority is not essential and that the 
Section is indeed responsive to the Board's recommendations.
The Organization Document provides that the Board 
shall consist of five members who "shall be drawn from among 
prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation, in­
cluding, but not limited to, former public officials, law­
yers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators, 
economists and business executives." Initial members of the 
Board, who were appointed by the Executive Committee of the 
Section with the approval of the Board of Directors of the 
Institute, are John J. McCloy, Chairman, Ray Garrett, Jr., 
Vice Chairman, and William L. Cary, John D. Harper and 
Arthur M. Wood. Mr. McCloy, The Assistant Secretary of War 
from 1941 to 1945, the United States Military Governor and 
High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952 and the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A., from 1955 to 1960, is currently a member of the 
New York City law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy; 
Mr. Cary, Chairman of the SEC from 1961 to 1964, is the 
Dwight Professor of Law at Columbia University; Mr. Garrett, 
Chairman of the SEC from 1973 to 1975, is a member of the 
Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton & Douglas; Mr. Harper is 
the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief 
Executive Officer of Aluminum Company of America; and Mr. 
Wood is the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and 
Chief Executive Officer of Sears, Roebuck and Co.
One of the first actions of the Board was to review 
provisions of the Organization Document regarding its own 
existence. In order to provide a higher degree of indepen­
dence from the Section and the Institute, the Board recom­
mended a change in the Organization Document, which was 
enacted by the Institute, to provide that
"Following its initial appointment, the Public 
Oversight Board shall, in consultation with and 
subject to the approval of the AICPA Board of 
Directors, appoint, remove, and set the terms 
and compensation of its members and select its 
chairman."
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Thereafter, the Board adopted bylaws establishing staggered 
three-year terms for its members, with the initial terms ex­
piring on December 31, 1978 for Messrs. Cary and Garrett, on 
December 31, 1979 for Messrs. Harper and Wood and on Decem­
ber 31, 1980 for Mr. McCloy. The Board's initial Chairman 
was selected by the Executive Committee, but future Chairmen 
are to be selected by the Board. In May 1978, the Board 
designated Mr. Garrett as Vice Chairman, and in December 
1978, Messrs. Cary and Garrett were elected to new 
three-year terms expiring on December 31, 1981. Annual com­
pensation for Board members is*. Chairman, $50,000; Vice 
Chairman, $40,000; and members, $30,000. The Institute 
indemnifies Board members against losses and expenses 
incurred by them in connection with litigation related to 
their official activities. Each member of the Board is 
authorized to use assistance available in his office or law 
firm in connection with the work of the Board. Mr. McCloy 
has designated Richard A. Stark, a partner in the New York 
City law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, as his 
assistant and Mr. Garrett has designated Charles R. Manzoni, 
Jr., a partner in the Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton & 
Douglas, as his assistant. Mr. Stark serves as Secretary of 
the Board and, prior to the employment of full-time staff, 
performed general administrative tasks for the Board,
The Board has employed a full-time Executive 
Director and full-time Technical Director and plans to ob­
tain additional staff as needed. Offices for the Board's 
administrative staff have been established at 1270 Avenue of 
the Americas, New York, New York 10020. Louis W. Matusiak, 
formerly a partner of Alexander Grant &. Company, has been 
Executive Director since May 1978. Saul Beldock, formerly a 
partner of S. D. Leidesdorf & Co. and Ernst & Ernst, was a 
consultant and later Technical Director until he resigned in 
January 1979 for personal reasons. Stuart Newman, formerly 
a manager with Touche Ross & Co., was appointed Technical 
Director in February 1979. Messrs. Matusiak, Beldock and 
Newman established procedures for monitoring peer reviews, 
which the Board approved, and carried out the monitoring of 
1978 peer reviews as discussed elsewhere in this annual 
report (see pages 14-15).
Three recently retired partners of CPA firms (see 
page 15), each of whom had extensive experience in his 
former firm's quality control and internal inspection pro­
gram, assisted the Board's staff in its monitoring of 1978 
reviews. It is contemplated that they and several other 
recently retired partners will be employed on a part-time 
basis to assist in the task of monitoring peer reviews in 
future years.
During its first year of operation, the Board held 
15 regular meetings and 3 telephone conference meetings.
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The Board also conducted public hearings in Chicago on 
August 17 and 18, 1978, regarding the scope of services 
issue discussed elsewhere in this report (see pages 16-21). 
Representatives of the Board attended nearly all meetings of 
the Executive Committee and Peer Review Committee of the 
Section during the last year and met numerous times with 
members of those committees and certain of the Commissioners 
and staff of the SEC. Messrs. McCloy and Garrett offered 
testimony to the Moss Subcommittee hearings on January 30, 
1978 and four Board members offered additional testimony to 
that subcommittee on July 28, 1978. Board members also par­
ticipated directly in the Board's oversight of the peer re­
view program by attending selected exit conferences between 
the reviewers and top management of the reviewed firms.
III. PEER REVIEW PROGRAM 
A. Objectives
The centerpiece of the Institute's program for vol­
untary self-regulation is the peer review program. As noted 
above, each member firm of the Section is required to comply 
with the Institute's professional standards and to have a 
peer review at least once every three years of its quality 
control policies and procedures as they relate to its 
accounting and auditing practice. The objectives of a peer 
review are to determine whether a reviewed firm's system of 
quality control for its accounting and auditing practice is 
appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed for the 
firm, whether its quality control policies and procedures 
are adequately documented and communicated to professional 
personnel, and whether they are being complied with so as to 
provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming 
with professional standards and the membership requirements 
of the Section. Such determination is accomplished by 
(1) study and evaluation of a reviewed firm's prescribed 
quality control policies and procedures; (2) testing for 
compliance with such quality control policies and procedures 
at each organizational or functional level within the firm 
by inspection of selected engagement working paper files and 
reports and other documents; and (3) testing for compliance 
with other membership requirements of the Section.
B. Peer Review Committee
The peer review program is administered by the Peer 
Review Committee, which consists of 15 individuals appointed 
from member firms by the Executive Committee. Almost all of 
these Committee members are from large national firms. The 
Board is aware that concerns have been expressed about a 
major representation from the larger firms and, in exercis­
ing its oversight responsibilities, will be mindful of this 
concern.
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The Peer Review Committee, under the leadership of 
Donald L. Neebes, a partner of Ernst & Ernst, has, in less 
than a year, (a) established the basic framework for peer 
reviews that involved numerous protracted meetings within 
the profession and with the staff of the SEC and with the 
Board and (b) produced a manual setting forth standards and 
guidelines for performing and reporting on peer reviews and 
establishing the administrative framework within which peer 
reviews are to be conducted. The Board has been impressed 
with the magnitude of the undertaking and the quality of the 
initial effort. In order to test the effectiveness of these 
standards and guidelines, the Committee is studying the re­
views that have been conducted to determine whether any re­
visions should be made.
The Committee also presented a two-day orientation 
session on peer reviews for member firms and reviewers. 
Future training programs are to be part of the Institute’s 
continuing education program.
C. Selection of Reviewers
Under the program established by the Peer Review 
Committee and approved by the Executive Committee, a peer 
review may be conducted at the reviewed firm’s option by 
another member firm selected by the reviewed firm or by a 
team appointed by the Peer Review Committee. The Committee 
is studying the possible use of review teams organized by 
state societies of CPAs and by associations of CPA firms.
In the initially proposed program, in addition to 
the review conducted either by members of a single firm or a 
team drawn from several firms, performance review panels 
were to be appointed by the Committee to determine whether 
the reviewers were qualified to conduct the particular 
review and whether the review was conducted in accordance 
with established standards. Performance review panels were 
to be appointed for firm-on-firm reviews and, on a test 
basis, for Committee-appointed team reviews. The Board ex­
pressed concern with the Committee’s decision that a firm 
that opted for a firm-on-firm review was permitted to select 
the reviewing firm. The staff of the SEC and others ex­
pressed concern about the reliability of the firm-on-firm 
reviews, especially since the firm can select its own re­
viewer. With regard to firm-on-firm reviews, the Board and 
the SEC in its 1978 Report to Congress (p. 24) suggested 
that, in order to overcome the concern expressed above, the 
panel’s responsibility be expanded in a substantive way to 
require an opinion as to the quality control system as it 
relates to the accounting and auditing practice of the re­
viewed firm. This suggestion was adopted by the Committee, 
and the panel’s designation was changed from a performance 
review panel to a quality control review panel.
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The Board is convinced that for medium and large 
firms the option to use a single firm, rather than an ad hoc 
team, is of great importance. There are several efficien­
cies derived from using the resources of a single firm as 
contrasted with the problems of assembling and coordinating 
a team of persons who have not previously worked together. 
Furthermore, while a firm can command the talents and exper­
tise of its top specialists in the conduct of a peer review 
it has undertaken, such specialists may not be as readily 
available for team-conducted reviews. The Board was also 
impressed with the argument that firm-on-firm reviews 
provide the reviewed firm greater flexibility in negotiating 
the fee. Also, the addition of the quality control review 
panel was intended to deal with whatever weakness might ap­
pear to result from the reviewed firm's right of selection.
D . Peer Review Reports and Letters of Comment
Upon completion of the review, the reviewing firm 
or the review team, as the case may be, furnishes its report 
to the reviewed firm. Further, a letter of comment on mat­
ters that may require corrective action and suggestions for 
improvement in its quality control system may be issued. 
The reviewed firm has the responsibility to submit that 
report, the letter of comments, if any, and its response 
thereto, promptly to the Peer Review Committee. The report 
of the quality control review panel is submitted directly to 
the Peer Review Committee, which makes the report available 
to both the reviewed and reviewing firms.
The Peer Review Committee examines each report, 
letter of comments and the reviewed firm's response to 
determine whether further action is required, including 
whether it should recommend the imposition of sanctions to 
the Executive Committee.
E . Content of Public Files
During the development of the peer review program, 
the Peer Review Committee initially proposed, and the Execu­
tive Committee concurred, that only the reviewer's report 
be made public. In discussions between the Board and mem­
bers of the Peer Review and Executive Committees, the Board 
expressed the view that there might be sufficient public in­
terest in the letters of comment to warrant making them 
public. A similar view was expressed in the SEC 1978 Report 
to Congress (pp. 24-25). The Committee reconsidered its 
position and decided to make the comment letters and re­
sponses thereto public.
In addition, several other documents are placed in 
the public files: (1) the firm's membership application, 
which contains a profile of the firm's personnel and prac­
tice; (2) the review panel's report, where required; (3) any
9
sanctions imposed by the Executive Committee; and (4) noti­
fication of discontinuance of review, if applicable.
F. Confidentiality of Working Papers
The Board, as part of its oversight of the program, 
has complete and unrestricted access to all phases of the 
peer review process, including working papers of reviewers 
and review panels. The Board, through its staff, has ex­
amined working papers for all 1978 peer reviews and will ex­
amine working papers of future reviews on a selected basis. 
In firm-on-firm reviews, the working papers remain the 
property of the reviewing firm. The working papers of 
review teams and panels are placed in private files at the 
Institute. Thus, none of the reviewers' working papers be­
comes part of the Board's files. The Board's files consist 
of (1) working papers developed by the Board's staff in the 
performance of its own monitoring functions and (2) selected 
items from the Institute's public files such as reports, 
letters of comment, responses of the reviewed firms, and 
certain information about the firms obtained from membership 
records. In order to maintain confidentiality of client- 
related information, the Board's working papers do not con­
tain any information that could be used directly or indi­
rectly to identify specific client engagements of the 
reviewed firm or personnel associated with such engagements.
In the SEC 1978 Report to Congress (p. 23), 
concern was expressed regarding whether the SEC would have 
sufficient access to the peer review process to make an 
objective evaluation of its adequacy. All papers in the 
files of the Board pertaining to 1978 peer reviews have been 
made available to the staff of the SEC. Providing the SEC 
access to other papers, particularly those containing spe­
cific client data, could create complex legal and practical 
problems for the Section and member firms and clients. The 
staffs of the SEC and the Board are working to develop an 
arrangement that will accommodate the legitimate concerns of 
the profession and the needs of the SEC.
G. Exclusion of Engagements from Scope of Review
Under procedures established by the Peer Review 
Committee, a reviewed firm may exclude certain engagements 
from the scope of a peer review, for example, when the fi­
nancial statements are the subject of litigation or regu­
latory investigation or when the client will not permit the 
working papers to be reviewed. If a request is made to ex­
clude a specific audit engagement from review, the reviewer 
must evaluate and concur with the reasonableness of the 
explanation for exclusion. If an engagement is excluded, 
alternative procedures are to be used by the reviewers, such 
as review of other engagements in the same industry or a 
similar area of practice and review of other work of super­
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visory personnel who participated in the excluded engage­
ment. If the exclusion materially limits the overall scope 
of the review, the reviewers issue a modified report. This 
standard,is in substantial agreement with the SEC 1978 
Report to Congress (p. 25), which states that valid reasons 
may exist for certain limitations, but expresses the view 
that "the ultimate decision to exclude these engagements 
should rest with the reviewers, under Board oversight, and 
should depend on whether they are satisfied that the re­
viewed firm’s personnel and the procedures utilized in those 
engagements can be adequately examined in other ways."
In its monitoring activities, the Board inquired 
whether there were any excluded engagements in the ten 
reviews conducted in 1978. It ascertained that two firms 
requested that a particular engagement be excluded; in one 
case, a nonpublic client did not grant permission, and in 
the second case, the client was under investigation by the 
SEC. In both cases, the reviewers concluded that the exclu­
sion did not materially affect the scope of review and 
selected another engagement to obtain the desired coverage. 
The Board intends to continue to monitor this aspect in 
future peer reviews.
H. Review of Audit Work Performed Outside of the
United States
As pointed out in the SEC 1978 Report to Congress 
(pp. 25-26), subjecting audit work performed outside of the 
United States to the review process involves complex prob­
lems that will take time to resolve. Professional bodies 
and firms in the United States have significant limitations 
on their authority to impose review requirements on account­
ing firms in other countries. Indeed such "intrusion" is 
often resented and must be handled with care.
The Peer Review Committee is studying this matter. 
Meetings have been held with representatives of the profes­
sions in Canada, West Germany, France, The Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom to describe the peer review program and 
to ask for their cooperation in review of international 
engagements. The current discussions are limited in scope, 
pertaining only to the quality of accounting and auditing 
work, including independence considerations, as it relates 
to financial statements used in connection with the offer or 
sale of securities in the United States. The various organ­
izations agreed to consider the matter and reconvene in 
June. The Board is monitoring the Committee's progress and 
will consider its conclusions before addressing this issue.
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I . Peer Review Schedule
The Peer Review Committee reports that as of 
March 31, 1979, 550 firms were members of the Section, 355 
of which had tentatively selected their review year as fol­
lows:
Year of Review Number of Firms
1978 (completed)
1979
1980
Undecided
10
110
235
195
550
Of the firms that have selected their review year, 136, or 
38 percent, will have firm-on-firm reviews.
Because member firms vary widely in size and in the 
nature of their practice, it is helpful to evaluate the 
schedule of peer reviews in terms of its coverage of SEC 
clients. The following schedule, based on data derived from 
"Who Audits America"5/ has been furnished by the Peer Review 
Committee:
Year of Review
Number
of SEC Clients Percent
1978 2,210 31%
1979 1,820 25
1980 3,010 42
Undecided 155 2
7,195 100%
Of the 3,010 SEC clients whose auditors will be covered by 
peer reviews in 1980, 2,300 are clients of firms that were 
reviewed in 1977, prior to the establishment of the Section. 
Thus, member firms that audit 63 percent of SEC clients were 
reviewed during 1977 and 1978 and member firms that audit 88 
percent will be reviewed by the end of 1979.
The Peer Review Committee reports that approxi­
mately 99% of the U.S. companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange and more than 93% of the U.S. companies
5/ 2nd edition (Menlo Park, California: 
Press, May 1978).
Data Financial
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listed on the American Stock Exchange are audited by members 
of the Section.6/ The Board is informed that the Section 
intends to make every effort to include in its membership 
all firms that audit SEC clients. Letters have been sent to 
all CPA firms that are not members of the Section and are 
believed to have one or more SEC clients. It is expected 
that as the Section becomes more established more firms will 
join.
Although the vast number of CPA firms that serve as 
auditors of companies whose securities are listed on the 
major stock exchanges are members of the Section, a large 
number of firms that practice before the SEC are not. While 
only 550 CPA firms are members of the Section, the staff of 
the SEC reports that there are approximately 1,200 CPA firms 
that audit the 9,700 companies required to file financial 
statements with the SEC under various sections of the 
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of
6/ Information on extent of coverage of listed companies 
by members of the Section:
NYSE ASE
Listed companies whose auditors 
are members of the Section 1,509 880
Listed companies whose auditors 
are not members of the Section 11 64
1,520 944
Listed foreign companies 
Other*
Total number of listed companies**
30
1
1,551
64
8
1,016
One company listed on the American Stock Exchange 
is shown by Moody's as not having an auditor; in 
other cases, no record of the company can be 
located in reference sources currently available.
* * Based on "mid-1977" listing supplied by the New 
York Stock Exchange and February 28, 1979 list­
ing supplied by the American Stock Exchange.
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1934. Some of the difference is accounted for by the vari­
ations in the definitions of an "SEC client" used in accumu­
lating these data.
Whatever the correct number of nonmember firms 
may be, the Board shares the profession’s and the SEC's con­
cern about firms that audit publicly held companies that are 
not members of the Section.
J. 1978 Peer Reviews
Peer reviews of ten firms, which among them audit 
over 2,200 SEC clients, were conducted in 1978. Six reviews 
were conducted by committee-appointed review teams and four 
were conducted by individual firms; three firm-on-firm re­
views were reviews of "Big Eight" firms and the other a re­
view of a single-office, three-partner firm with no SEC 
clients.
Unqualified reports were issued in nine of the ten 
reviews. The qualified report resulted not from a deficien­
cy in the firm's quality control system but from a failure 
by the reviewed firm to comply with the Section's membership 
requirement relating to liability insurance coverage; the 
firm subsequently obtained the required amount of insurance 
coverage.
The Board's staff questioned the appropriateness of 
the application of reporting standards to one review and re­
quested the Peer Review Committee to investigate. The Com­
mittee had not concluded its consideration of this matter as 
of the date of this report. In addition, the Board’s over­
sight program includes monitoring reviews commenced but dis­
continued prior to completion. Two such cases occurred in 
1978 and the Peer Review Committee is reviewing both cases 
to ascertain whether the discontinuances were justified.
K. The Board's Monitoring of the Peer Review Program
In order to ascertain whether the Section's quality 
control compliance reviews are conducted and reported upon 
according to the "Standards for Performing and Reporting on 
Quality Control Compliance Reviews" as promulgated in the 
manual published by the Peer Review Committee, and whether 
the reports and letters of comments are consistent with the 
findings of the reviewers, the Board instructed its staff to 
prepare and implement an appropriate monitoring program. 
The Board's oversight and monitoring program consists of 
(1) postreview of working papers prepared by reviewers, in­
cluding panels, (2) observation of reviews in process with 
emphasis on attendance at exit conferences, and (3) other 
selected procedures. The selection of specific peer reviews 
and the number of each type of review to be covered in the 
Board's monitoring program are determined from time to time
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by the Board. The Board will make such comments regarding 
the peer review program as it finds appropriate to the Exec­
utive Committee and Peer Review Committee and to such others 
as it deems advisable.
The objectives of the Board’s program are to deter­
mine whether peer review standards have been adhered to with 
respect to the scope and conduct of review, excluded engage­
ments, documentation of work performed, report and letter of 
comments issued. The Board’s program relating to firm-on- 
firm reviews selected for monitoring and the attendant qual­
ity control review panels includes a review of all working 
papers prepared by the panels and preselected portions of 
the working papers prepared by the reviewing firms; addi­
tional portions are selected for review if results obtained 
from the preselected portions are inconclusive. The scope 
of the Board’s monitoring of a committee-appointed team 
review is identical to that of a firm-on-firm review.
For selected reviews, visits are made by Board per­
sonnel to certain offices of the reviewed firm while the 
review is in process. These visits are generally made by 
Board staff representatives, except that one or more Board 
members attend selected exit conferences. In addition, in­
terviews are held with, or questionnaires are sent to, 
reviewers regarding the conduct of review; interviews are 
held with, or questionnaires are sent to, top management of 
reviewed firms regarding the conduct of and results obtained 
from the engagement; and reviewers’ qualifications are 
tested.
It is expected that most quality control system 
reviews will be conducted in the summer and fall months. To 
assist the full-time staff in monitoring these reviews on a 
timely basis, a cadre of qualified monitors will be employed 
on a part-time basis. The cadre will consist solely of re­
tired partners of CPA firms who have had extensive experi­
ence in at least one of the following areas: (a) quality 
control system design and operation, (b) internal inspection 
program, (c) independent preissuance review, or (d) engage­
ment partner on SEC audit clients. Generally, only partners 
who have retired within the prior three-year period will be 
employed.
The Board successfully tested this concept in its 
monitoring of the 1978 reviews by using the services of John 
W. Nicholson (formerly of Arthur Young & Company), R. Kirk 
Batzer (formerly of Coopers & Lybrand) and Harry F. Reiss, 
Jr. (formerly of Ernst & Ernst). Each one served as the 
Board’s representative in monitoring one of the larger firm 
reviews; in each case, the Board representative was not for­
merly associated with either the reviewing firm or the 
reviewed firm. Their extensive experience provided the ad­
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ditional benefit of suggestions for modifications to and 
refinement of the Board's program.
Based on its oversight of the 1978 reviews, the 
Board suggested to the Peer Review Committee several im­
provements in the peer review process, certain of which have 
been adopted.
L. The Board's Conclusions on the Peer Review Program
Based on its experience with the program to date, 
the Board concludes that the standards and procedures for 
conducting, reporting on and administering the peer review 
program are satisfactory and that the program is being im­
plemented in a professional manner.
The Board believes that the ultimate objectives of 
the program -- to improve financial reporting and the qual­
ity of audits of financial statements -- are being achieved. 
Even though it may be assumed that the majority of member 
firms have acceptable quality control systems or will have 
by the time they are reviewed, the Board believes improve­
ments are likely to be effected as a result of the peer 
review process, both for the reviewed firms and the 
reviewers' firms.
The Board's observations of the 1978 reviews indi­
cate that the dual reporting plan for firm-on-firm reviews 
is working satisfactorily. However, after some experience 
has been gained, the Board may seek a reconsideration of 
this plan in the hope that the duplicative aspects can be 
reduced or eliminated.
IV. SCOPE OF SERVICES BY CPA FIRMS
A major study undertaken by the Board in 1978 
focused on the "scope of services" issue. A basic question 
was raised as to whether a certified public accountant who 
provides management advisory services ("MAS") for an audit 
client impairs his ability to render an independent opinion 
on the fairness of that client's financial statements or im­
pairs his professional image. Over the years, the profes­
sion, Congressional committees and other critics and commen­
tators have studied the issue and offered varying opinions 
and advice. The SEC also expressed interest in the subject 
and in September 1977 solicited public comment on several 
questions relating to scope of services in Securities Act 
Release No. 5869 (September 26, 1977). The SEC, however, 
refrained from taking any action, beyond requiring certain 
disclosures in proxy material, to deal with the subject un­
til the Board's views were added to the deliberative 
process.
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The Board undertook the study of the scope of serv­
ices issue in May 1978, pursuant to a request by the Execu­
tive Committee that the Board consider the proposal of that 
Committee to amend portions of the Organization Document 
relating to the permissible scope of MAS for members of the 
Section. The proposed amendments were tentatively approved 
by the Executive Committee on May 8, 1978, subject to ob­
taining the Board’s views.
The scope of services criteria initially embodied 
in the Organization Document provided that members of the 
Section should refrain from providing MAS to audit clients 
that are SEC reporting companies if providing such services 
would impair their independence or if such services are pre­
dominantly commercial in character, inconsistent with the 
firm's professional status as certified public accountants, 
or inconsistent with the firm's responsibilities to the pub­
lic. The Organization Document also stated that, in deter­
mining which MAS to perform, such services should be predom­
inantly in "accounting and financial related areas." Psy­
chological testing, conducting public opinion polls, and 
merger and acquisition work for a finder's fee were ex­
pressly prohibited. Marketing consulting, plant layout, and 
executive search were also specifically addressed.
The Executive Committee's May 8 proposal took a 
slightly different tack. As proposed, the membership re­
quirement relating to scope of MAS would prohibit members of 
the Section from furnishing certain services to an SEC 
client when such services (1) impair the firm's independence 
in expressing an opinion on financial statements of that 
client or (2) require skills not related to accounting or 
auditing. The proposal also contained a discussion of the 
application of those two criteria to executive recruitment, 
marketing consulting, plant layout and design, product de­
sign and analysis, insurance actuarial services, and em­
ployee benefit consulting, indicating which types of ser­
vices within those broad categories would and would not 
satisfy the criteria. Although the Executive Committee had 
previously asked the Board's views of the proposal, on May 
26, 1978, it adopted that portion of the proposal proscrib­
ing executive recruiting services.
Because of the importance of this issue and the 
varied, sometimes conflicting, interests of persons most 
concerned, the Board resolved to solicit written comments 
and to hold public hearings on the subject. Written com­
ments were received from 152 individuals and firms, and 31 
persons testified at the hearings held in Chicago, Illinois 
on August 17 and 18, 1978.
In addition to developing its own record, the Board 
drew from the several studies, articles, and surveys that 
have focused on the scope of services issue over the last
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fifteen years and from the more than 400 written public com­
ments on the subject received by the SEC pursuant to Securi­
ties Act Release No. 5869. With that background material 
and after months of consideration and deliberation, in March 
1979, the Board published its report on Scope of Services by 
CPA firms ("MAS Report").
The Board's conclusions and recommendations to the 
Executive Committee in the MAS Report under the caption 
"Conclusions and Recommendations" are set forth below:
The conclusions and recommendations contained in 
this section of the report reflect the Board's views 
with respect to the specific scope of service limita­
tions which are presently a condition of membership in 
the SEC Practice Section and those scope of service lim­
itations which are embodied in the Proposal. While the 
Board's general conclusions and recommendations might be 
viewed in some respects as more permissive than the ex­
isting and proposed scope of service limitations, this 
should not suggest that the Board perceives no problems 
associated with accounting firms furnishing all forms of 
MAS to audit clients. The most fundamental departure by 
the Board from the existing and proposed scope of ser­
vice limitations appears in the Board's treatment of 
those forms of MAS which do not impair auditor indepen­
dence but which involve services not in accounting or 
financial related areas or which do not require skills 
related to accounting or auditing--that is, services 
which may impair the professional image of an accountant 
but not his independence.
As discussed more fully in the body of this report, 
the Board is concerned with professional image but does 
not believe that rule-making is the appropriate way to 
address the problem. Rather, the Board believes it is 
preferable to rely on public disclosure, supplemented by 
the admonition to members of the SEC Practice Section to 
exercise self-restraint and judgment before venturing 
into new areas of MAS.
With this in mind, the Board has drawn the follow­
ing conclusions and makes the following recommendations:
1. There are many potential benefits to be 
realized by permitting auditors to perform MAS for 
audit clients which should not be denied to such 
clients without a strong showing of actual or po­
tential detriment. The profession, therefore, 
should be careful not to impose unnecessarily broad 
prophylactic rules with respect to MAS and indepen­
dence.
18
2. The Board generally concludes that manda­
tory limitations on scope of services should be 
predicated only on the determination that certain 
services, or the role of the firm performing cer­
tain services, will impair a member's independence 
in rendering an opinion on the fairness of a 
client's financial statements or present a strong 
likelihood of doing so. Independence is generally 
defined as the ability to operate with integrity 
and objectivity. Integrity is an element of char­
acter, and objectivity relates to the ability of an 
auditor to maintain impartiality of attitude and 
avoid conflicts of interest. All conflicts of in­
terest are not avoidable and some conflicts of in­
terest produce countervailing benefits. Such con­
flicts are accepted, consistent with the concept of 
independence, because of practical necessity and 
the realization of important benefits, coupled with 
the fact that auditor integrity and various legal 
incentives provide adequate public protection. 
This helps explain public acceptance of the fact 
that auditors can be "independent" even though the 
client selects them and pays their fee. It also 
helps explain why there has been public acceptance 
of accounting firms furnishing a variety of tax ad­
visory services to audit clients. Recognizing, 
therefore, that independence in an absolute sense 
cannot be achieved, when evaluating whether certain 
services should be prohibited, it is necessary to 
consider the potential benefits derived from the 
service and balance them against the possible or 
apparent impairment to the auditor's objectivity.
3. At this time no rules should be imposed 
to prohibit specific services on the grounds that 
they are or may be incompatible with the profession 
of public accounting, might impair the image of the 
profession, or do not involve accounting or audit­
ing related skills.
4. The existing limitations on MAS concern­
ing independence contained in the Professional 
Standards relating to Management Advisory Services 
("MAS Professional Standards"), AICPA, Professional 
Standards, Vol. 1, MS §§ 101 et seq. and the Code 
of Professional Ethics, AICPA, Professional Stan­
dards, Vol. 2, ET §§ 50 et seq. [footnote omitted] 
embrace several provisions that are helpful in 
ensuring that independence will be maintained. 
Compliance with those applicable provisions should 
be made a condition of membership in the SEC Prac­
tice Section and peer reviews should be required to 
test for compliance.
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5. Amendments to Regulation 14A (the proxy 
rules) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
certain publicly available reports required of mem­
bers of the SEC Practice Section will increase the 
amount of public disclosure concerning the nature 
and amount of MAS furnished by an auditor to an au­
dit client and will reveal whether the client's au­
dit committee or board of directors have both ap­
proved the MAS and considered its possible effect 
on independence. To the extent that certain MAS 
may be perceived publicly as impairing indepen­
dence, the new disclosure rules, including the role 
of the audit committee or the board of directors, 
should either allay suspicion or cause clients and 
auditors to alter their relationships. These dis­
closure provisions should be given a chance to 
work, and they should serve to provide a stronger 
data base for monitoring of this area.
The Board does, however, recommend that SEC 
Practice Section members be required to include in 
their annual disclosure statements filed with the 
SEC Practice Section disclosure of gross fees both 
for MAS and tax services performed for audit 
clients expressed as a percentage of aggregate fees 
charged during the reporting period.
6. In the Board's view an accounting firm's 
independence is not impaired solely because a per­
son associated with the firm acts as an enrolled 
actuary for an employee benefit plan of an audit 
client or as an enrolled actuary for such a plan 
which is an audit client. The Board, however, 
believes that an accounting firm should not provide 
actuarial services for an insurance company audit 
client unless those services are supplemental to 
primary actuarial advice furnished by another actu­
ary not associated with the accounting firm.
7. The Board accepts the recent action of 
the Executive Committee proscribing certain execu­
tive recruiting services inasmuch as the services 
proscribed are perceived by others as having a 
strong likelihood of impairing independence, are 
available from other responsible sources, and do 
not otherwise produce sufficient countervailing 
benefits. In general, however, the Board is reluc­
tant to support prohibitions against useful serv­
ices which are based primarily on appearance 
without an adequate basis in fact.
Thus, in general, the Board rejected that aspect of 
the Executive Committee's proposal, as well as the then ex­
isting scope of services limitation, which attempted to pro­
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scribe services that may be incompatible with the profession 
of accounting or the image of the accounting profession 
without also impairing independence. Rather, as a general 
principle, the Board recommended that maintenance of inde­
pendence be the sole limiting criterion.
While the Board accepted the Executive Committee's 
decision to proscribe certain executive recruiting services 
and recommended that limitations be placed on members of the 
Section in performing primary or exclusive actuarial serv­
ices that have an effect on the financial statements of in­
surance company audit clients, it counselled the profession 
not to undertake any other effort at this time to identify 
specific services which should be proscribed. Rather, the 
MAS Report notes that other less draconian measures or pro­
cedures should be employed before resorting to outright pro­
scription. These other measures are the new disclosures in 
proxy statements7/ and in reports filed by members of the 
Section and the recent encouragement of audit committees and 
boards of directors to be aware of the existence of MAS en­
gagements, to approve them, and in so doing, consider the 
matter of independence. In addition, the Board recommends 
that the scope of the Section's mandatory peer review be 
revised to require a review of MAS engagements performed for 
audit clients to test for compliance with the independence 
standards.
The Board believes that these new measures should 
serve to allay public suspicion, to the extent it exists, 
and will furnish a data base for further monitoring in this 
area.
In its MAS Report, the Board cautioned the Execu­
tive Committee that its "conclusions should not be inter­
preted to mean that the Board views the matter of scope of 
services with complacency or believes that possible dangers 
can be avoided solely with general exhortations to members 
to preserve independence." While it does not believe that 
rule-making is the appropriate way to address the problem, 
the report states "the Board believes it is preferable to 
rely on public disclosure, supplemented by the admonition to 
members of the SEC Practice Section to exercise self- 
restraint and judgment before venturing into new areas of 
MAS."
V. PROCEDURES FOR ALLEGED OR POSSIBLE AUDIT FAILURES
One of the first matters identified by the Execu­
tive Committee for consultation with the Board relates to
7/ Accounting Series Release No. 250 (June 29, 1978).
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the investigative and disciplinary action that should be 
taken by the Section with respect to an alleged or possible 
audit failure involving a member firm.
The Organization Document provides that the Execu­
tive Committee shall have the authority to impose sanctions 
on member firms either on its own initiative or on the basis 
of recommendations of the Peer Review Committee and shall 
establish procedures designed to ensure due process to firms 
in connection with disciplinary proceedings. Sanctions con­
templated in the Organization Document include (a) required 
corrective measures by the firm, (b) additional requirements 
for continuing professional education, (c) accelerated or 
special peer reviews, (d) admonishments, censures, repri­
mands, (e) monetary fines, (f) suspension of membership and 
(g) expulsion from membership. Under these provisions, upon 
the occurrence of an alleged or possible audit failure, 
which might raise a question concerning the quality controls 
of the member firm involved, the Section could accelerate 
the commencement of a regular triennial peer review or order 
a special peer review. The purpose of such a peer review 
would be to determine whether the member firm is maintaining 
and applying quality controls in accordance with standards 
established by the Section. Under the existing structure 
such reviews would not deal with the specific case involving 
an alleged audit failure, but could examine the quality con­
trols of the member firm and of the office of the firm 
(including the individuals) involved in the alleged audit 
failure.
It should be noted that individual CPAs who are 
members of the Institute are subject to disciplinary action 
by the AICPA Ethics Committee ("Ethics Committee"). Pro­
ceedings of the Ethics Committee are generally deferred dur­
ing the pendency of litigation, a fact that was noted and 
criticized by the Cohen Commisson.8/ Since an alleged audit 
failure will often cause civil litigation to be commenced or 
threatened, as well as investigation and threatened enforce­
ment action by the SEC or other government agencies, the 
question is presented whether the Section should adopt the 
deferral policy of the Ethics Committee in such circum­
stances.
Before addressing the basic policy issues, the 
Board received from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy a com­
prehensive memorandum dated September 11, 1978 entitled 
"Disciplinary Procedures for Audit Failures: an Analysis of 
Legal Issues." The purpose of the memorandum was to pro-
8/ The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, 
Conclusions, and Recommendations (1978), pp. 149-150.
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vide background information to the Board regarding legal is­
sues raised by a private self-disciplinary system for member 
firms in the event of an alleged or possible audit failure. 
The memorandum reviewed reports of Congressional committees, 
the SEC, the Cohen Commission and other interested commenta­
tors, and described the disciplinary structures already in 
place. The memorandum analyzed the potential prejudice to 
member firms which may result from conducting disciplinary 
proceedings prior to the conclusion of any civil or criminal 
actions and discussed the question of whether the simultan­
eous conduct of disciplinary proceedings raises constitu­
tional problems. It further discussed issues relating to 
the effectiveness of a disciplinary system which, absent 
legislation, would have to rely on the contractual consent 
of member firms to provide testimony and documents in the 
event of disciplinary proceedings. Requirements that disci­
plinary procedures provide due process safeguards for member 
firms also were considered. The memorandum also mentioned 
certain antitrust implications of disciplinary procedures.
The memorandum concluded generally that there are 
no insurmountable legal impediments to the conduct of disci­
plinary proceedings while litigation is pending or threat­
ened, but that any such proceedings must provide minimum due 
process protections and in certain cases there may be prac­
tical limitations on the ability of such proceedings to ob­
tain necessary evidence.
The Board also received from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley 
& McCloy a memorandum dated November 10, 1978 and revised 
December 29, 1978 entitled "Disciplinary Proceedings for 
Audit Failures: Areas for Discussion" which sought to iden­
tify some of the broad policy issues and other considera­
tions involved in the disciplinary procedure question. In 
addition, at the Board's request, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 
legal counsel for the Institute, furnished the Board a memo­
randum dated December 1, 1978, entitled "Deferral of Disci­
plinary Proceedings" which discussed various legal consider­
ations involved in the Institute's policy of deferring dis­
ciplinary actions against individual members during the pen­
dency of civil, criminal or administrative proceedings aris­
ing out of the matter which is the subject of the disciplin­
ary proceeding.
After extended study of the matter, including the 
memoranda mentioned above and discussions with the Executive 
Committee, the Board concluded that the protection of users 
of audited financial statements should be the dominant con­
sideration in any response by the Section to information 
suggesting the possibility of an audit failure. Some ap­
parent audit failures may raise a question with respect to 
auditing standards and procedures. This was the case, for 
example, when the difficulties of Equity Funding Corporation 
first became generally known and the press suggested that it
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involved a great "computer fraud" accomplished by electronic 
devices that defied the auditors' procedures. These sugges­
tions turned out to be wrong, but, should a case giving rise 
to such suggestions occur in the future, the Section should 
be prepared to begin a prompt inquiry and to recommend 
appropriate changes.
The more usual type of alleged or possible audit 
failure could raise questions concerning the quality con­
trols of the member firm, or perhaps the firm's office re­
sponsible for the audit. In such cases the Board has recom­
mended that the Section be prepared to take measures, in­
cluding special peer reviews, to assure itself and others 
that there is no likelihood of future harm from the auditing 
work of that firm or office.
Formal disciplinary proceedings directed toward the 
punishment of the member firm are of less immediate impor­
tance. One purpose of disciplinary action, to be sure, is 
the deterrent effect on the firm that is punished and its 
example to others. Nevertheless, where the Section satis­
fies itself that an alleged or possible audit failure does 
not indicate any significant danger of avoidable future 
failures, or, if it does, that corrective measures have been 
taken, the Board believes that the Section will not be dere­
lict if it postpones formal disciplinary proceedings in def­
erence to considerations of fairness and due process arising 
from the pendency of civil or criminal litigation or govern­
ment action, or in the end foregoes such proceedings on the 
ground that the member firm has suffered enough and that 
punishment resulting from the other actions has accomplished 
all of the prophylactic benefit that can be expected. How­
ever, the Section should have the authority to institute 
formal disciplinary proceedings in those circumstances where 
such action is deemed appropriate notwithstanding the pen­
dency of litigation or government action.
To that end, the Board has recommended to the Sec­
tion that a permanent committee be established to monitor, 
and to determine what action if any should be taken with 
respect to, alleged or possible audit failures involving 
member firms. At its March 27, 1979 meeting, the Executive 
Committee agreed in general with the concepts expressed by 
the Board and appointed a task force to develop recommenda­
tions for implementation.
VI CONCLUSIONS
During its first year the Board has participated 
in the development of the Section, which is a new mechanism 
within the accounting profession for self-regulation and 
self-discipline of CPA firms engaged in auditing SEC 
clients. Members of the Section have committed themselves
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to burdensome and costly mandatory peer reviews, and the 
Section is dealing with other major issues, including the 
scope of services issue and the question of the Section's 
role with respect to alleged or possible audit failures.
The Institute deserves much credit for its aggres­
sive development of the Section and its programs. It is 
also important to acknowledge the substantial contribution 
of the SEC through constructive criticism provided by Chair­
man Williams and other Commissioners and by A. Clarence 
Sampson, Chief Accountant, and members of his staff in many 
meetings and telephone conferences. It is too early to 
state that all concerns of the SEC have been or can be dealt 
with to its satisfaction. Nevertheless, the close coordi­
nation and exchange of views between the Section and the SEC 
have been important ingredients in moving forward to date.
The Board believes that, due to the substantial 
progress to date, the strong commitment of the profession 
and the encouragement and support of the SEC, the Section's 
program for self-regulation will be effective. Moreover, 
the Board believes that, as a matter of principle, self­
regulation is preferable to additional governmental regula­
tion and that every effort should be made to ensure the suc­
cess of the Section's program.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
March 31, 1979
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EXHIBIT I
Organization Document as Amended Through 
March 31, 1979 (Excluding Appendices A and B 
Relating to Management Advisory Services)
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Organizational Structure and 
Functions of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for 
CPA Firms
I. Source of Authority
The section was established by a resolution of the Council of
the AICPA adopted on September 17, 1977.
II. Name
The name of the section shall be the “SEC Practice Section”
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
III. Objectives
The objectives of the section shall be to achieve the following:
1. Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission through the estab­
lishment of practice requirements for member firms.
2. Establish and maintain an effective system of self-regula­
tion of member firms by means of mandatory peer reviews, 
required maintenance of appropriate quality controls, 
and the imposition of sanctions for failure to meet 
membership requirements.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of the section’s regulatory system 
through the monitoring and evaluation activities of an 
independent oversight board composed of public mem­
bers.
4. Provide a forum for development of technical information 
relating to SEC practice.
IV. Membership
1 .  E l i g i b i l i t y  a n d  A d m i s s i o n  o f  M e m b e r s
All CPA firms are eligible for membership in the section 
even though they do not practice before the SEC. Mem­
bership in the section shall not constitute membership in 
the AICPA nor entitle any member firm to any of the
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rights or privileges of membership in the AICPA. To 
become a member, a firm must submit to the section a 
written application agreeing to abide by all of the re­
quirements for membership. The application must be 
accompanied by firm information for the most recent full 
fiscal year as described under 3 (g) of this section.
The membership of the section shall consist of all 
firms which meet with the admission requirements and 
continue to maintain their membership in good standing.
2. T e r m i n a t i o n  a n d  R e i n s t a t e m e n t  o f  M e m b e r s
(a) Membership of a CPA firm may be terminated—
(1) By submission of a resignation, provided the 
firm is not the subject of a pending investiga­
tion or recommendation of the peer review 
committee for sanctions or other disciplinary 
action by the executive committee or under 
review by the public oversight board.
(2) By action of the executive committee for 
failure to adhere to the requirements of mem­
bership.
(b )  Membership of a terminated CPA firm may be 
reinstated—
(1) By complying with the admission requirements 
for new members if termination occurred by 
resignation.
(2) By complying with the admission requirements 
for new members and obtaining the approval of 
the executive committee if termination was 
imposed as a sanction.
5. R e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  M e m b e r s
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the following: 
(a) Ensure that a majority of members of the firm are 
CPAs, that the firm can legally engage in the practice 
of public accounting, and that each proprietor, 
shareholder, or partner of the firm resident in the 
United States and eligible for AICPA membership 
is a member of the AICPA.
(b) Adhere to quality control standards established by 
the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee.
(c) Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s accounting and 
audit practice every three years or at such additional 
times as designated by the executive committee, the
3 0
reviews to be conducted in accordance with review 
standards established by the section’s peer review 
committee.
(d )  Ensure that all professionals in the firm resident in 
the United States, including CPAs and non-CPAs, 
participate in at least one hundred twenty hours 
of continuing professional education over three 
years, but in not less than twenty hours in any given 
year.
(e) Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each 
SEC engagement which has had another audit part­
ner-in-charge for a period of five consecutive years 
and prohibit such incumbent partner from return­
ing to in-charge status on the engagement for a 
minimum of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirement shall not become effective 
until two years after a firm becomes a member.
(2) In unusual circumstances, the chief executive 
partner of a firm or his designee may grant no 
more than one two-year extension so long as 
there is an in-depth supplemental review by 
another partner, or
(3) An application for relief is granted by the 
peer review committee on the basis of unusual 
hardships.
(f) Ensure that a concurring review of the audit report 
by a partner other than the audit partner in charge 
of an SEC engagement is required before issuance 
of an audit report on the financial statements of an 
SEC registrant. The peer review committee may 
authorize alternative procedures where this require­
ment cannot be met because of the size of the mem­
ber firm.
(g) File with the section for each fiscal year of the United 
States firm (covering offices maintained in the 
United States and its territories) the following in­
formation to be open to public inspection:
(1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership or 
corporation) and identification of domestic 
affiliates rendering services to clients.
(2) Description or chart of internal organizational 
structure and international organization (in-
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cluding the nature of relationships main­
tained in each geographic region).
(3) Number and location of offices.
(4) Total number of partners and non-CPAs with 
parallel status within the firm’s organizational 
structure.
(5) Total number of CPAs (including partners).
(6) Total number of professional staff (including 
partners).
(7) Total number of personnel (including item 
6, above).
(8) Number and names of SEC clients for which 
the firm is principal auditor-of-record and any 
changes of such clients.
(9) Number of SEC audit clients each of whose 
total domestic fees exceed 5 percent of total 
domestic firm fees and the percentage which 
each of these clients’ fees represent to total 
domestic firm fees.
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has com­
plied with AICPA and SEC independence re­
quirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation as re­
quired under generally accepted accounting 
principles and indicating whether such pend­
ing litigation is expected to have a material 
effect on the firm’s financial condition or its 
ability to serve clients.
(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, tax, 
and MAS expressed as a percentage of total 
gross fees.
(h ) Maintain such minimum amounts and types of 
accountants’ liability insurance as shall be prescribed 
from time to time by the executive committee.
(i) When determining its scope of management advisory 
services, place primary emphasis on accounting and 
financial related areas* and refrain from performing
* These areas would include the design and installation of systems (such as 
computer-based systems and procedures) and the performance of studies related 
to the accounting, general record-keeping, and control. This process relates to 
recording, compiling, analyzing, and communicating financial and economic 
information, expressed in money or other quantities. This process involves and 
provides support to the essential organizational functions, such as (1) sales and
32
(j)
(k)
management advisory services engagements for audit 
clients whose securities are registered with the SEC 
that—
(1) Would create a loss of the firm’s independence 
for the purpose of expressing opinions on 
financial statements of such clients.
(2) Are predominantly commercial in character 
and inconsistent with the firm’s professional 
status as certified public accountants.
(3) Are inconsistent with the firm’s responsibilities 
to the public.
(4) Consist of the following types of services:
(i) Psychological testing
(ii) Public opinion polls
(iii) Merger and acquisition assistance for a 
finder’s fee
(5) Will be proscribed by the executive committee 
after further study and which comprise portions 
of what is included under the broad classifica­
tions of marketing consulting and plant layout 
as tentatively outlined in Appendix A.
(6) May be proscribed by the executive committee 
from time to time after further study based on 
the concepts described above and in Appendix 
A. (See resolution of executive committee, 
Appendix B.)
Report annually to the audit committee or board of 
directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of each 
SEC audit client on the total fees received from the 
client for management advisory services during the 
year under audit and a description of the types of 
such services rendered.
Report to the audit committee or board of directors 
(or its equivalent in a partnership) of each SEC 
audit client on the nature of disagreements with the 
management of the client on financial accounting
distribution of products or services; (2) protection and custody of assets; (3) 
procurement and use of raw materials, capital, and human resources; and (4) 
production of products or services. These complex functions are closely inter­
related in an integrated system. The specific elements of the overall system 
interact with each other in many ways and at many levels of the organization. 
The process also embraces systems for planning and budgeting, including 
comparisons between planned results and actual results.
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and reporting matters and auditing procedures 
which, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have 
caused the issuance of a qualified opinion on the 
client’s financial statements.
(l) Pay dues as established by the executive committee 
and comply with the rules and regulations of the 
section as established from time to time by the 
executive committee and with the decisions of the 
executive committee in respect of matters within its 
competence; cooperate with the peer review com­
mittee in connection with its duties, including dis­
ciplinary proceedings; and comply with any sanction 
which may be imposed by the executive committee.
V. Governing Bodies
The activities of the section shall be governed by an execu­
tive committee having senior status within the AICPA with 
authority to carry out the activities of the section. Such 
activities shall not conflict with the policies and standards 
of the AICPA.
All activities of the section shall be subject to the over­
sight and public reporting thereon by a public oversight 
board.
VI. Executive Committee
1 . C o m p o s i t i o n  a n d  T e r m s
(a) The executive committee shall be composed of 
representatives of at least twenty-one member firms.
(b )  The terms of executive committee members shall 
be for three years, with initial staggered terms to 
provide for seven expirations each year.
(c) Executive committee members shall continue in 
office until their successors have been appointed.
2 . A p p o i n t m e n t
(a) The members of the executive committee shall be 
appointed by the AICPA chairman with the ap­
proval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(b) All appointments after the initial executive commit­
tee is established shall also require approval of the 
then existing executive committee.
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(c) Nominations for appointments of representatives of 
member firms to the executive committee shall be 
provided to the chairman of the AICPA by a 
nominating committee of the section. The section’s 
nominating committee shall be elected by the 
AICPA Council and consist of individuals drawn 
from seven of the member firms of the section. It 
is intended that nominations shall adhere to the 
principle that the executive committee shall at all 
times include representatives of all member firms 
which audit the financial statements of thirty or 
more registrants under section 12 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 and at least five represen­
tatives of firms which audit financial statements of 
fewer than thirty such registrants plus one addi­
tional such representative for each representative, in 
excess of sixteen, of firms which audit thirty or more 
registrants.
3 . E l e c t i o n  o f  C h a i r m a n
The chairman of the executive committee shall be elected 
from among its members to serve at the pleasure of the 
executive committee but in no event for more than three 
one-year terms.
4 .  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  F u n c t i o n s  
The executive committee shall—
(a) Establish general policies for the section and over­
see its activities.
( b )  Amend requirements for membership as necessary, 
but in no event shall such requirements be designed 
so as to unreasonably preclude membership by any 
CPA firm.
(c) Establish budgets and dues requirements to fund 
activities of the section not provided for in the 
AICPA general budget. Such dues shall be scaled 
in proportion to the size of member firms.
(d) Determine sanctions to be imposed on member 
firms based upon recommendations of the peer re­
view committee of the section.
(e) Receive, evaluate, and act upon other complaints 
received with respect to actions of member firms.
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(f) Establish the initial public oversight board with the 
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(g) Appoint persons to serve on such committees and 
task forces as necessary to carry out its functions.
(h )  Make recommendations to other AICPA boards and 
committees for their consideration.
(i) Consult from time to time with the public oversight 
board.
5. Q u o r u m ,  V o t i n g ,  M e e t i n g s ,  a n d  A t t e n d a n c e
(a) A majority of the members of the executive com­
mittee or their designated alternates must be present 
to constitute a quorum.
(b )  Affirmative votes of a majority of the members of 
the executive committee shall be required for action 
on all matters.
(c) Meetings of the executive committee shall be held 
at such times and places as determined by the 
chairman.
(d )  Representatives of member firms of the section may 
attend meetings of the executive committee as ob­
servers under rules established by the executive com­
mittee. Such attendance will not be permitted 
when the committee is considering disciplinary 
matters.
VII. Public Oversight Board
1 .  S iz e ,  A p p o i n t m e n t ,  R e m o v a l ,  a n d  C o m p e n s a t i o n
The public oversight board shall consist of five members. 
Members of such board shall be drawn from among 
prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation, 
including, but not limited to, former public officials, 
lawyers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators, 
economists, and business executives.
Following its initial appointment, the public over­
sight board shall, in consultation with and subject to the 
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors, appoint, re­
move, and set the terms and compensation of its members 
and select its chairman. However, such board shall auto­
matically terminate in the event of the termination of the 
SEC practice section of the AICPA Division for Firms.
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2. R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  F u n c t i o n s  
The public oversight board shall—
(a) Monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction 
activities of the peer review and executive commit­
tees to assure their effectiveness.
( h) Determine that the peer review committee is as­
certaining that firms are taking appropriate action 
as a result of peer reviews.
(c) Conduct continuing oversight of all other activities 
of the section.
(d) Make recommendations to the executive committee 
for improvements in the operations of the section.
(e ) Publish an annual report and such other reports 
as may be deemed necessary with respect to its 
activities.
(f) Engage staff to assist in carrying out its functions.
(g) Have the right for any or all of its members to 
attend any meetings of the executive committee.
VIII. Peer Reviews
1. R e v i e w  R e q u i r e m e n t s
Peer reviews of member firms shall be conducted every 
three years or at such additional times as designated by 
the executive committee.
2. P e e r  R e v i e w  C o m m i t t e e
(а) C o m p o s i t i o n  a n d  a p p o i n t m e n t
The peer review committee shall be a continuing 
committee appointed by the executive committee 
and shall consist of fifteen individuals selected from 
member firms.
(b) R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  f u n c t i o n s
The peer review committee shall—
(1) Administer the program of peer reviews for 
member firms.
(2) Establish standards for conducting reviews.
(3) Establish standards for reports on peer reviews 
and publication of such reports.
(4) Recommend sanctions and other disciplinary 
decisions (including whether the name of the 
affected firm is published) to the executive 
committee.
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(5) Consult from time to time with the public 
oversight board.
(6) Keep appropriate records of peer reviews which 
have been conducted.
3 . P e e r  R e v i e w  O b j e c t i v e s
The objectives of peer reviews shall be to determine
that—
(a) Member firms, as distinguished from individuals, 
are maintaining and applying quality controls in 
accordance with standards established by the AICPA 
Quality Control Standards Committee. Reviews for 
this purpose shall include a review of working 
papers rather than specific “cases.” (The existence 
of “cases” in a firm might raise questions concerning 
its quality controls.)
(b )  By reviewing the procedures of member firms, ap­
propriate steps are being taken to gain proper as­
surance about the quality of work done on those 
portions of audits performed in other countries.
(c) Member firms are meeting membership require­
ments.
IX. Sanctions Against Firms
1. A u t h o r i t y  to  I m p o s e  S a n c t io n s
The executive committee shall have the authority to im­
pose sanctions on member firms either on its own initia­
tive or on the basis of recommendations of the peer re­
view committee and shall establish procedures designed 
to assure due process to firms in connection with dis­
ciplinary proceedings.
2. T y p e s  o f  S a n c t io n s
The following types of sanctions may be imposed on 
member firms for failure to maintain compliance with 
the requirements for membership:
(a) Require corrective measures by the firm including 
consideration by the firm of appropriate actions 
with respect to individual firm personnel.
(b )  Additional requirements for continuing professional 
education.
(c) Accelerated or special peer reviews.
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(d )  Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
(e)  Monetary fines.
(f) Suspension from membership.
(g) Expulsion from membership.
X. Financing and Staffing of Section
1. S e c t i o n  S ta f f  a n d  M e e t i n g  C o s ts
(a) The president of the AICPA shall appoint a staff 
director and assign such other staff as may be re­
quired by the section.
(b )  The cost of the section staff and normal meeting 
costs shall be paid out of the general budget of the 
AICPA.
2. P u b l i c  O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d  a n d  S p e c ia l  P r o j e c t s
(a) The costs of the public oversight board and its staff 
shall be paid out of the dues of the section.
(b )  The cost of special projects shall be paid out of the 
dues of the section.
Xi. Relationship to Other AiCPA Segments
Nothing in the organizational structure and functions of this 
section shall be construed as taking the place of or changing 
the operations of existing senior committees of the AICPA 
or the status of individual CPAs as members of the AICPA.
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